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Animal Memory: Rats Bind Event Details into Episodic
Memories
A recent study shows that rats remember multiple details of an event in a way
that suggests those details are bound into episodic memories that the rats use
when faced with a foraging task.
Michael J. Beran
Humans have their own personal past,
and typically can opt to ‘relive’ that past
by remembering specific episodes,
ranging from a short time interval ago
(‘‘what did I have for breakfast?’’) to
long ones (‘‘what was it like the first
time I rode my bicycle?’’). In these
instances of remembering, the features
of the event being remembered are
intricately bound, in the sense that the
‘who’, ‘what’, ‘when’, ‘where’, and even
‘why’ information within the memory
feels interwoven. This ‘episodic
memory’ system allows us to relive our
personal past in a way that gives rise to
a feeling of continuity of experience,
and that also allows us to
re-experience the feelings that came
along with the bound features of the
past event [1,2]. Such a system is seen
as distinct from semantic memory
stores that contain factual information,
but without the personal qualities of
episodic memories. A new study [3]
reported in this issue of Current Biology
assesses whether rats may have
episodic memories, using multiple
events experienced in succession to
determine what rats remember about
each event.
There is an ongoing debate about
whether nonhuman species show
evidence of such episodic memories,
with numerous species having been
tested (for example [4–9]). There is no
controversy over whether animals have
memories, or how specific those
memories can be, or what kinds of
things can be remembered. In many
cases, animals even can provide some
or all of the ‘who’, ‘what’, ‘when’ and
‘where’ information from a previously
experienced event [10–15]. What has
been controversial is the degree to
which animals exhibit the bound,
specific and contextual memories that
humans have, and whether those
memories also contain the experience
of an event being relived, as they do for

humans [16,17]. It is this last
component that makes episodic
memory research contentious in
comparative cognition research,
because there may be no way to show
that this ‘autonoetic’ component of
episodic memory occurs in animals
[2,18]. This issue can be minimized,
however, by focusing on the nature of
the remembered information itself,
without worrying about whether the
animal has the experience of
remembering it.
In the newest attempt to assess
episodic memory in animals, Crystal
and Smith [3] have taken this approach
by documenting what objective
information rats can remember about
events they experienced. They have
shown that rats encode what foods
were hidden in different radial arm
mazes, and where they were hidden,
while also remembering context cues
that were important for knowing how to
forage when the rats returned to each
maze at a later time. These results
afford the opportunity for progress in
understanding how animals might
remember their experiences, and the
development of potential animal
models of various forms of human
memory (including episodic memory),
as well as of forms of memory
impairment and loss.
Crystal and Smith [3] presented rats
with a radial arm maze in which some
arms contained highly preferred
chocolate at their endpoints and some
ended with less preferred chow pellets.
Rats sometimes found the chocolate
on their own by running down the arm
of the maze, whereas other times the
rats were placed at the chocolate by
the experimenter, and it was this
aspect of a trial that was critical to
assessing what the rats remembered.
These different means of discovering
the chocolate indicated whether or not
chocolate would again be at the same
location in that maze on the next visit.
The rule was that ‘‘if you find chocolate

on your own in this location, it will be
here again next time, but if the
experimenter places you at the
chocolate, this location will be empty
next time.’’ And, further complicating
the rats’ experiences was the use of
two rooms in some conditions, where
sometimes the initially baited
chocolate locations were the same in
both rooms but the means of finding
the chocolate differed (i.e., in one room
the rat was placed in one arm with
chocolate but ran to the other arm,
whereas in the other room the manner
of finding chocolate was reversed for
those same locations in the maze). This
required the rats to pay attention to and
remember what room they were in,
whether they found the chocolate on
their own or with help, and where the
chocolate was when they found it. All of
these individual units of information
were informative as to whether the rats
should go back to specific arms of the
maze where chocolate had been, or
whether they should avoid those arms.
(The low preference chow was always
in different arms on the second visit
compared to the first, and the rats
typically switched arms for chow
pellets and did not revisit the original
chow locations.)
What is critical about this study [3] is
the use of the two rooms with some
overlapping features but also some
unique features in each of the
memories the rats formed when in the
rooms. When only one room is used in
this kind of test, rats could learn where
chocolate would be on the next visit
without need of remembering all
aspects of the event as a bound set.
When a rat went into successive rooms,
however, it had to use the cues in the
room as part of its memory of whether it
was placed next to the chocolate or
found chocolate on its own in that
room, and thereby could anticipate
whether chocolate would replenish in
specific locations or would not.
Because the authors increased the
memory load, there were multiple
overlapping features of each event
that could only be used accurately
during future maze visits if the rats
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remembered that each event occurred
in a distinct room.
Crystal and Smith [3] argue that
keeping separate in memory multiple
episodes that share similar
components is a central feature of
bound memory representations. If the
rats instead had just remembered each
of the unbound aspects of each event,
then performance would have suffered
because the two events shared some
of these aspects. Rats would have
struggled to find the preferred
chocolates in the correct locations
when revisiting the mazes. But the
authors found that rats were likely to go
to maze arms that held chocolate,
taking into account which room they
were in, and how they had found
chocolate in that room previously. This
suggests that they remembered each
experience (in each room) as an event
with multiple, bound features.
Whether these results indicate that
the rats’ bound memories meet
everyone’s definition of episodic
memory (for example [1,2,16,17])
should not be the main issue. Perhaps
they do not, but that makes these
results no less important. Questions
about whether animals do or do not
show ‘mental time travel’ [16–18]
sometimes can distract us from the
equally important (and perhaps more
immediately pressing) goal of
establishing just how accurate and
flexible the memories of animals can be
when those memories are needed to
generate intelligent behaviors (or, for
those studying prospective cognition,
just what kinds of anticipatory
behaviors we can find in nonhuman
animals). Certainly, consideration of
whether these kinds of experiences
have the qualities that are critical for

human mental time travel will highlight
aspects of the nature of animal
consciousness, and can offer insights
into the evolution of human cognitive
abilities and consciousness. But there
is at least equal importance in
comparative cognitive science in
documenting where and why success
and failure occur in memory tasks, and
how bound the components are for
personal memories of the past, along
with how episodic memories may serve
an adaptive function in future oriented
behaviors such as prospective memory
and planning [19,20]. Crystal and Smith
[3] have provided compelling new data
in this debate, showing that the binding
of features is likely a widespread
aspect of animal memory and one that
is potentially of high translational value
in terms of understanding some of the
fundamental aspects of human
memory.
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Sensory Biology: Echolocation from
Click to Call, Mouth to Wing
Echolocators use echoes of sounds they produce, clicks or calls, to detect
objects. Usually, these signals originate from the head. New work reveals that
three species of bats use their wings to generate echolocation signals.
M. Brock Fenton1
and John M. Ratcliffe2
Donald R. Griffin [1] coined the term
‘echolocation’ to describe the use of
echoes of self-generated acoustic

signals for orientation, as seen in bats
and some blind people. However, not
all bats echolocate. The list of
echolocating animals also includes
toothed whales, some shrews and
tenrecs, as well as oilbirds and some
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swiftlets [2]. Most bats produce their
echolocation signals in their voice
boxes (larynges) [3] but at least two
species of Old World fruit bats,
(Pteropodidae) Rousettus aegyptiacus
(Figure 1) and Rousettus leschenaulti),
use tongue clicks as echolocation
signals [2]. Some blind people also use
tongue clicks as echolocation signals
[4]. But the arsenal of bats for
producing echolocation signals is even
broader than we had realized. In this
issue of Current Biology, Arjan
Boonman, Sara Bumrungsri and Yossi
Yovel [5] show that some bats

